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Introduction  
Philosophy  and  Ethics  classes  pursue  a  number  of  important  goals.  Furthering   
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argumentative  skills  is  undoubtedly  among  them.  But  how  can  these  skills  be  fostered  in  a  
systematic  way?  In  this  essay,  we  propose  an  answer  to  this  question.  We  suggest  
furthering  argumentative  skills  by  way  of  precise  spiral-curricular  standards.  In  section  1,  we  
review  curricula,  school  books,  and  other  materials  from  the  German-speaking  world  to  show  
that  there  is  an  urgent  need  for  such  standards  for  the  teaching  and  learning  of  
argumentation.  Our  focus  is  on  secondary  schools,  but  the  findings  can  also  be  of  use  for  
learning  and  teaching  in  universities,  especially  in  introductory  classes.  In  section  2,  we  
begin  to  present  our  proposal  in  more  detail.  We  wish  to  emphasize,  however,  that  the  
proposal  is  in  many  ways  still  a  draft.  The  framework  is  informed  both  by  research  in  
argumentation  theory  and  by  practical  experience  in  schools.  As  such,  it  has  already  been  
revised  and  improved  several  times,  but  it  can  and  should  be  developed  further  on  the  basis  
of  practical  experience  and  theoretical  reflection.  
1  Names  are  listed  in  alphabetical  order.  This  text  was  written  in  the  context  of  one  of  the  working   
groups  of  the  DFG-network  "Argumentieren  in  der  Schule"  (Argumentation  in  Secondary  Schools).  
The  authors  would  like  to  thank  all  group  members.  A  German  translation  of  this  paper  is  available  at  
www.philovernetzt.de .  
2  We  also  refer  here  to  comparable  school  subjects  with  names  that  differ  depending  on  the  federal   
state  or  canton,  such  as  "Werte  und  Normen"  [Values  and  Norms]  in  Lower  Saxony,  "Philosophie  /  
Pädagogik  /  Psychologie"  [Philosophy  /  Pedagogy  /  Psychology]  in  the  canton  of  Bern,  or  
"Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religionskunde"  [Life-Ethics-Religion]  in  Brandenburg.  In  Austria,  philosophy  
and  ethics  education  comprises,  on  the  one  hand,  part  of  the  subject  "Psychology  and  Philosophy"  
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  subject  "Ethics"  as  an  alternative  to  religious  education,  which  was  
introduced  as  a  school  pilot  project  in  1997  and  has  just  become  a  compulsory  substitute  subject  for  
religious  education  from  the  school  year  2021/22  onwards.  
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1.  Desiderata  for  the  Teaching  and  Learning  of  
Argumentation  
It  is  largely  undisputed  that  the  development  of  argumentative  skills  is  both  a  central  goal  of  
teaching  in  ethics  and  philosophy  as  well  as  of  education  generally.  Accordingly,  furthering  
argumentative  skills  is  given  great  importance  in  the  curricula  and  examination  requirements  
for  these  fields,  as  well  as  in  the  German-language  discourse  on  the  teaching  of  philosophy.  
3
 Evidence  suggests  that  teachers  also  attach  great  importance  to  imparting  argumentative   
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skills.  In  a  survey  of  philosophy  and  ethics  teachers,  almost  85%  of  the  71  respondents  
agreed  that  the  ability  to  formulate  and  examine  arguments  were  among  the  most  important  
skills  for  students  to  obtain  from  philosophy  and  ethics  classes  (see  Löwenstein  et  al.  2020,  
pp.  103–105).  
Nevertheless,  fostering  such  competences  gradually  and  systematically  can  present  
difficulties  for  many  teachers,  especially  with  regard  to  younger  learners  whose  competence  
development  in  this  area  is  just  beginning.  Among  other  things,  one  can  often  observe  that  
argumentative  skills  are  assumed  rather  than  systematically  developed  in  lessons  which  
involve  argumentation,  especially  by  teachers  who  are  new  to  the  job.  The  so-called  PLATO  
method  for  the  analysis  of  philosophical  texts,  for  instance,  requires  much  more  detailed  
guidance  than  is  commonly  given,  particularly  regarding  its  third  and  fourth  steps  –  “set  forth  
the  text's  reasoning”  and  “evaluate  the  viability  of  the  arguments”.  Methodological  guidance  
for  the  evaluation  of  the  viability  of  arguments  is  typically  underdetermined  in  this  respect:  
"Are  the  premises  convincing?  Are  the  definitions  correct?  Are  the  concepts  appropriate?  
Has  anything  important  been  neglected?"  (Wittschier  2010,  pp.  113 – 115,  214,  our  
translation).  School  books  also  often  feature  exercises  that  invite  students  to  discuss  various  
3  See,  e.g.,  Brun  2016;  Dietrich  2003;  Goergen  2015;  Henke  2015;  Pfeifer  2009;  Pfister  2014;  Roeger   
2015;  Rösch  2012,  ch.  13.  
4  For  Germany,  see  e.g.  the  “Einheitliche  Prüfungsanforderungen  für  das  Abitur  Philosophie”   
(Kultusministerkonferenz  2006,  p.  5f.)  and  Berlin's  Ethics  curriculum  (Senatsverwaltung  für  Jugend,  
Bildung  und  Familie  Berlin  2015,  p.  6,  12f.).  For  Austria,  see  the  curriculum  "Philosophie  und  
Psychologie.  Für  Gymnasium  und  Realgymnasium"  (Bundesgesetzblatt  2016),  the  old  curriculum  for  
the  school  pilot  project  in  Ethics  (Bundes-ARGE  Ethik  2017),  and  the  draft  of  the  new  curriculum  for  
Ethics  in  connection  with  the  upcoming  introduction  of  Ethics  as  an  alternative  compulsory  subject  to  
religious  education,  starting  in  the  school  year  2021/22  (Bundesministerium  Bildung,  Wissenschaft  
und  Forschung.  Bundes-ARGE  Ethik  2020).  In  the  following,  we  will  speak  of  the  "old"  and  "new"  
Ethics  curricula  in  Austria,  for  simplicity’s  sake.  For  Switzerland,  see  e.g.  the  framework  curriculum  for  
Matura  schools  (EDK  1994,  p.  84)  and  the  curriculum  for  Philosophy  as  a  supplementary  subject  in  
the  canton  of  Bern  (2017).  
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questions  without  providing  a  definition  for  "argumentation"  that  is  in  any  way  different  from  
the  everyday  use  of  the  word.  If,  however,  specific  and  systematic  argumentative   
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competences  are  lacking,  there  is  a  risk  that  the  argumentative  exchange  remains  
superficial,  conceptually  fuzzy,  merely  additive,  and  potentially  faulty.  Even  if  the  subject  
matter  in  question  is  exciting,  students  often  find  argumentation  itself  to  be  a  fruitless  
endeavor.  One  leaves  the  lesson  none  the  wiser.  The  class  is  unlikely  to  make  any  progress  
with  regard  to  the  content  of  the  philosophical  issues.  Methodological  progress  is  even  less  
likely.  This  frustrating  experience  can  lead  to  a  perception  of  philosophical  discussions  as  
largely  arbitrary  and  fruitless  (see  also  Burkard  2018,  p.  117).  
Competences  do  not  arise  out  of  nowhere,  especially  not  during  a  single  lesson.  In  this  vein,  
it  may,  at  first  glance,  seem  advantageous  that  argumentative  competences  are  mentioned  
in  the  lesson  plans  of  various  subjects,  for  instance  German,  Math,  Social  sciences,  and  
foreign  languages.  Accordingly,  argumentative  skills  would  not  only  be  furthered  in   
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Philosophy  and  Ethics  lessons  but  also  in  the  context  of  many  other  subjects.  At  a  second  
glance,  however,  one  must  consider  that  in  the  absence  of  a  systematic  foundation  for  
argumentative  competences,  students  are  ill-equipped  to  develop  them  across  a  range  of  
subjects  and  over  an  extended  period.  Argumentative  abilities  need  to  be  developed  
systematically  and  by  means  of  a  spiral  curriculum  (see  for  instance,  Althoff  2016b,  p.  9).  
They  must  be  "broken  down"  into  specific  sub-competences  and  skills,  which  can  be  
acquired,  practiced,  applied,  and  reflected  upon  at  different  levels.  These  systematic  
foundations  are  primarily  to  be  found  in  the  domains  of  applied  and  informal  logic  as  well  as  
of  argumentation  theory.  Thus,  they  fall  primarily  within  the  purview  of  philosophy.   
7
5  See,  e.g.,  Fischill  2015,  pp.  16,  35,  197,  236f.;  Rösch  2014,  p.  28f.  
6  See  e.g.,  Budke  &  Meyer  2015  for  an  overview  of  the  importance  of  argumentation  in  various  school   
subjects.  The  Austrian  curriculum  for  Mathematics  (“Unterstufe”,  i.e.  for  lower  classes)  states,  e.g.:  
“The  following  basic  mathematical  skills  are  to  be  developed:  [...]  argumentation  and  precise  work,  in  
particular:  precise  description  of  facts,  properties  and  concepts  (defining);  working  with  a  conscious  
application  of  rules;  justifying  (proving);  working  with  logical  modes  of  reasoning;  justifying  decisions  
(such  as  the  choice  of  a  specific  path  towards  a  solution  or  a  form  of  representation."  According  to  the  
curriculum  for  the  first  living  foreign  language,  teachers  should  promote  the  ability  to  "recognize  [the]  
main  conclusions  in  clearly  written  argumentative  texts"  and  to  "write  [texts]  in  which  arguments  for  or  
against  a  certain  point  of  view  are  given  [...]  and  explained"  (see  the  relevant  curricula  in:  
Bundesgesetzblatt  2016,  all  translations  ours).  These  formulations  are  even  more  specific  than  those  
found  in  the  curriculum  for  Psychology  and  Philosophy  (also  in:  Bundesgesetzblatt  2016)  or  in  the  
new  curriculum  for  Ethics  (Bundesministerium  Bildung,  Wissenschaft  und  Forschung.  Bundes-ARGE  
Ethik  2020).  
7  The  fact  that  ethics  and  philosophy  classes  can  establish  the  systematic  foundations  for   
argumentative  competences  for  various  school  subjects  is  true  insofar  as  they  can  teach  the  basic  
concepts  of  the  theory  of  argumentation  and  establish  a  general  understanding  of  justificatory  
reasoning.  Nevertheless,  the  term  "argumentative  competences"  is  used  in  different  subjects  with  
different  orientations,  which  differ,  in  part,  from  the  competences  presented  here.  
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However,  so  far,  curricula  for  Philosophy  or  Ethics  have  only  formulated  rather  general  goals.  
They  (often  only  roughly)  set  forth  achievement  levels  for  argumentative  competence  but  fail  
to  specify  how  and  through  which  intermediate  steps  these  are  to  be  achieved.  Even  in   
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curricular  requirements  that  do  specify  (sub)competences,  the  requirements  and  the  
necessary  intermediate  steps  for  the  development  of  the  abilities  in  question  remain  
underdetermined.  Concrete  standards  must  be  set  and  (sub)goals  for  competences  must  be   
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operationalized  as  a  basis  for  the  systematic  and  progressive  furthering  of  argumentative  
skills,  also  by  means  of  exercises  that  practice,  apply,  and  reflect  upon  the  relevant  
(sub)competences.    
In  Germany  and  in  Austria,  commercial  teaching  materials  and  articles  in  practice-oriented  
journals  are  only  occasionally  suitable  to  close  this  gap.  In  Germany,  an  analysis  of  the  
relevant  school  books  for  the  lower  secondary  level  in  various  federal  states  shows  that  they  
are  not  designed  for  the  systematic  and  progressive  furthering  of  argumentative  abilities  and  
often  make  use  of  a  vague  or  everyday  concept  of  argument  (see  Burkard  2021).  When  the  
term  "argument"  is  used  at  all,  books  often  apply  it  in  a  manner  synonymous  with  "reason"  or  
"justification"  instead  of  introducing  the  three-part  argument  concept  that  is  especially   
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relevant  for  philosophy  –  where  arguments  are  understood  as  connections  between  
statements  such  that  one  or  more  of  these  statements,  the  premises,  justify,  or  at  least  
purport  to  justify,  another  statement,  the  conclusion.  If  this  fundamental  structure  is  not  
brought  into  view,  a  systematic  examination  of  different  reasoning  structures  and  evaluative  
criteria  for  individual  argumentative  elements  or  errors  can  hardly  take  place.  Although  there  
8  For  Germany,  see  e.g.  the  curriculum  for  Practical  Philosophy  (Ministerium  für  Schule  und   
Weiterbildung  des  Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen  2008,  pp.  15,  24f.,  31),  the  curriculum  for  Ethics  at  
secondary  level  I  in  Baden-Württemberg  (Ministerium  für  Kultus,  Jugend  und  Sport  
Baden-Württemberg  2016,  pp.  11f.)  and  the  curriculum  for  the  subject  Values  and  Norms  at  
secondary  level  I  (Niedersächsisches  Kultusministerium  2017,  pp.  15,  37f.).  For  Austria,  see  the  
curriculum  for  Psychology  and  Philosophy  (in:  Bundesgesetzblatt  2016)  as  well  as  the  old  
(Bundes-ARGE  Ethik  2017)  and  the  new  curriculum  for  Ethics  (Bundesministerium  Bildung,  
Wissenschaft  und  Forschung.  Bundes-ARGE  Ethik  2020).  The  explanations  in  various  Swiss  curricula  
also  remain  very  general.  E.g.,  relevant  basic  skills  for  the  subject  of  Philosophy  in  the  canton  of  St.  
Gallen  are  outlined  only  as  follows:  "Be  able  to  present  complex  relationships  with  conceptual  clarity  
and  stringent  logic"  and  "Analyze  and  consider  philosophical  texts  with  regard  to  form  and  content"  
(Lehrplan  für  das  Gymnasium  im  Kanton  St.  Gallen  2008,  p.  168,  our  translation);  see  also  the  
curricula  given  in  fn.  4.   
9  For  Germany,  see  e.g.  Ministerium  für  Schule  und  Berufsbildung  Schleswig-Holstein  2016,  p.  17,   
and  Senatsverwaltung  für  Jugend,  Bildung  und  Familie  Berlin  2015,  p.  14f.  Among  the  Austrian  
curricula  for  Philosophy  or  Ethics  classes,  the  most  detailed  description  of  argumentative  skills  can  be  
found  in  the  old  version  of  the  curriculum  for  Ethics:  "Arguing  and  judging:  -  Making  a  well-founded  
(complete  and  conclusive)  judgment  in  an  argument;  -  Connecting  personal  opinions  with  arguments  
supporting  other  positions  and  -  Arguing  interactively;  -  Reflecting  on  argumentation  processes  and  
one's  own  ways  of  thinking”  (Bundes-ARGE  Ethik  2017,  p.  5,  our  translation).  
10  See,  for  instance,  Eisenschmidt  2012,  pp.  99,  223;  Michaelis  &  Thyen  2012,  pp.  197,  216f.  
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are  instances  of  a  three-part  conception  of  arguments  in  some  of  the  books  that  were  
analyzed,  this  alone  is  insufficient.  In  one  such  instance,  the  concept  receives  an  extensive  
introduction  in  the  first  chapter,  only  to  be  never  used  again  in  the  remainder  of  the  book.  
Accordingly,  the  volume  lacks  any  additional  exercises  for  furthering  argumentative  abilities  
in  a  targeted  way  (see  Hack  &  Sänger  2013).  In  another  school  book,  relevant  terms  such  as  
"thesis",  "argument",  and  "conclusion"  are  introduced  in  such  a  way  that  they  cannot  be  
reconciled  with  their  standard  uses  in  philosophy  (see  Rösch  2014,  p.  28).  The  same  book  
also  lacks  materials  that  could  serve  to  systematically  and  progressively  promote  the  
relevant  argumentative  skills.   
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In  the  most  popular  Austrian  school  books,  the  three-part  conception  of  arguments  only  
appears  in  connection  with  formal  logic,  for  instance  in  the  presentation  of  syllogistics.  When  
these  books  do  deal  with  the  nature  and  structure  of  arguments  (which  is  rarely  the  case),  
formal  logic  (its  history  and  forms)  remains  absolutely  dominant  over  applied  and  informal  
logic  as  well  as  argumentation  theory.  In  one  such  book,  one  finds  only  a  very  short  section   
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on  "Argumentation  Theory"  at  the  end  of  the  chapter  on  "The  Logical  and  Logic".  This  
section,  after  the  introductory  sentence  “There  are,  however,  many  arguments  that  cannot  
simply  be  reduced  to  the  standardized  forms  of  logic",  offers  only  a  list  of  potential  fallacies  
(Liessmann  et  al.  2016,  pp.  41–43,  all  translations  ours).  This  gives  rise  to  the  impression  
that  formal  logic  is  responsible  for  valid  forms  of  inference  while  argumentation  theory  exists  
only  to  cover  erroneous  forms.  This  view  is  not  only  untenable  in  substance,  but  it  also  
raises  the  question  of  the  relative  value  of  formal  and  informal  logic  for  the  teaching  of  
philosophy  in  schools.  Formal  logic  (rightly)  has  a  prominent  status  in  philosophy,  much  less  
so  argumentation  theory,  which  also  includes  informal  reasoning.  In  reference  to  the  
teaching  of  philosophy  in  schools  –  especially  in  view  of  the  limited  time  allotted  to  it  –  the  
question  arises  how  sensible  it  is  to  teach  syllogistic  forms,  types  of  statements,  the  square  
of  opposition,  truth  tables  etc.,  while  at  the  same  time  not  even  establishing  the  three-part  
conception  of  arguments.  
Since  Philosophy  and  Ethics  classes  in  schools  should  above  all  be  concerned  with  the  
education  of  young  people  who  mostly  do  not  plan  to  study  philosophy,  let  alone  become  
professional  philosophers,  it  would  be  advisable  to  give  more  emphasis  to  real  
11  See  Burkard  (2021)  for  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  examples  given  in  this  paragraph,  as  well  as   
other  examples  from  school  books,  different  teaching  materials,  and  curricula.  
12  See,  e.g.,  Fischill  2015,  Section  II.9.;  Lacina  2014,  Section  2.1;  Liessmann  et  al.  2016,  sect  1.4.  A   
positive  exception  is  the  school  book  by  Karl  Lahmer  (2017),  often  used  in  Austria,  which  has  
separate  subchapters  on  logic  (5.2)  and  on  argumentation  (5.3).  
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argumentation  rather  than  to  the  merely  theoretical  knowledge  of  formal  logic.  At  the  same  
time,  the  necessary  logical  foundations  should  be  put  to  use  in  furthering  argumentative  
skills  in  a  systematic  way.  In  this  context,  it  is  especially  important  to  maintain  a  close  
connection  to  exciting  philosophical  questions.  That  way,  students  can  come  to  realize  that  
even  detailed  logical  analysis  is  not  merely  fiddling  about  but  that  it  promotes  real  progress  
on  the  subject  matter  at  stake.  
2.  Standards  in  the  Teaching  and  Learning  of  
Argumentation  
We  have  seen  various  points  at  which  standards  for  the  teaching  and  learning  of  
argumentation  are  much  needed.  In  the  following  sections  we  will  present  a  draft  of  a  
framework  for  such  standards  which  is  intended  to  tackle  these  difficulties.  This  
spiral-curricular  model  of  argumentative  competences  is  meant  to  help  teachers  introduce  
the  relevant  competences  to  students  early  on  in  their  school  career  in  a  systematic  way.  To  
that  end,  argumentation  is  broken  down  into  sub-competences  (clearly  often  inseparable  in  
argumentative  practice),  which  are  in  turn  divided  into  different  levels.  In  this  way,  teachers  
are  supported  in  gradually  furthering  complex  argumentative  competences  among  students. 
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This  section  begins  with  an  exposition  of  the  competences  and  the  four  levels  we  use  to  
partition  their  development  as  well  as  the  background  concepts  involved  therein.  The  
following  sections  (3–7)  describe  the  individual  levels  and  present  the  specific  individual  
competences  and  background  concepts.  The  appendix  provides  a  summary  table  of  this  
content  and  we  recommend  keeping  this  table  available  for  reference  while  reading.  
Argumentative  competences  can  be  broken  down  into  single,  interrelated  sub-competences  
in  many  ways.  For  our  purposes,  we  distinguish  three  core  competences  and  then  seek  to  
illuminate  their  forms  and  interdependencies:  
A. Developing  arguments :  Students  develop  their  own  arguments  and  formulate  them  in  
a  clear  and  convincing  manner.  
13  As  part  of  an  ongoing  project  within  the  DFG  network  "Argumentation  in  Secondary  Schools",   
illustrative  exercises  and  explanations  for  all  levels  and  sub-competences  of  the  table  are  currently  
being  formulated  (forthcoming  soon). 
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B. Interpreting  arguments :  Students  recognize  and  understand  arguments  in  oral  
contributions,  texts,  and  other  media.  
C. Evaluating  arguments :  Students  evaluate  the  plausibility  and  justificatory  power  of  
arguments.  
These  general  core  competences  include  more  specific  subject  knowledge  and  
sub-competences  at  different  levels.  At  each  of  these  levels,  however,  the  competences  in  
question  remain  closely  related.  Their  interrelation  is  expressed,  inter  alia,  in  the  background  
concepts  which  are  listed  separately  at  every  level  as  they  occur  in  each  of  the  three  
competences  in  different  ways.  These  concepts  refer,  for  instance,  to  specific  forms  and  
properties  of  arguments  (for  example  the  validity  of  arguments  or  the  structure  of  arguments  
by  analogy),  which  play  a  role  in  the  development  of  one's  own  arguments  (A)  as  well  as  in  
the  interpretation  and  evaluation  of  the  arguments  of  others  (B  and  C).  These  background  
concepts  therefore  cut  across  all  core  competences  rather  than  denoting  a  fourth  such  
competence  with  equal  status.  Therefore,  they  are  not  represented  by  the  alphabetically  
subsequent  letter  "D”  in  our  summary  table  but  rather  by  an  "X".  Being  able  to  master  and  
apply  these  concepts  is,  of  course,  a  competence  itself.  However,  this  competence  is  not  
manifest  next  to  but  rather  within  the  core  competences,  and  typically  in  all  three  of  them.  
For  example,  the  ability  to  apply  the  concept  of  modus  ponens  is  manifest  in  the  
interpretation,  evaluation,  and  development  of  arguments  of  this  form.  The  following  sections  
therefore  always  relate  the  concepts  to  the  specific  sub-competences  in  question.  
The  systematic  distinction  of  core  competences  A,  B,  and  C,  in  addition  to  the  background  
concepts,  X,  provides  a  sequence  for  teaching  and  learning  only  in  a  very  limited  sense:  in  
order  to  evaluate  an  argument,  it  must  first  be  understood,  that  is,  interpreted.  B  is  therefore  
a  necessary  condition  for  C.  But  the  three  core  competences  essentially  depend  on  one  
another.  For  example,  the  principle  of  charity  requires  that  the  evaluation  of  arguments  also  
factors  into  their  interpretation  (see  section  4).  The  distinction  between  the  three  core  
competences  proposed  here  is  therefore  essentially  open  to  various  teaching  approaches  
and  methods  for  developing  the  interrelated  sub-competences  and  skills  of  each  level.  
Nevertheless,  we  do  suggest  a  sequence  for  teaching  the  competences  progressively  
through  the  distinction  of  the  aforementioned  levels  I  –  IV.  The  content  and  skills  of  the  more  
basic  level  are  generally  presupposed  and  further  developed  in  those  that  follow.  
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The  order  of  the  levels  is  not  based  on  age  groups  or  class  levels  but  rather  on  the  logic  of  
the  relevant  argumentative  competences  and  on  the  students'  previous  experience.  The  
levels  are  therefore  labeled  as  follows:  
I. Beginner  
II. Basic  
III. Intermediate  
IV. Advanced  
Of  course,  while  the  most  complex  matters  are  not  suitable  for  ten-year-olds,  some  
entry-level  competences  may  be.  This  is  one  of  the  advantages  of  our  proposal:  it  is  
adaptable  to  many  different  contexts  in  schools  and  elsewhere.  Nevertheless,  we  can  
suggest  the  following  as  a  rough  guide  for  school  teaching.  If  Philosophy  or  Ethics  lessons  
are  offered  at  the  lower  secondary  level,  levels  I  and  II  can  be  covered  until  the  end  of  the  
final  year  of  lower  secondary  education,  and,  depending  on  the  type  of  school  and  the  
particular  group,  even  parts  of  level  III.  Level  III  should  be  suitable  for  classes  at  the  upper  
secondary  level  as  well  as  at  least  some  parts  of  level  IV,  depending  on  the  particular  group  
and  the  character  of  the  school  subject.  If  Philosophy  or  Ethics  lessons  begin  in  upper  
secondary  school,  the  beginner  and  basic  levels  can  of  course  be  introduced  much  more  
quickly  than  at  lower  grades.  
Those  are  all  the  elements  that  build  the  systematic  framework  for  our  standards.  In  the  
following  sections  3–7,  we  add  content  to  this  structure.  Individual  elements  will  be  
designated  with  abbreviations  drawn  from  their  respective  positions  in  the  summary  table.  
The  content  itself  is  largely  common  knowledge  within  philosophy  and  receives  excellent  
treatment  in  the  extensive  introductory  literature  on  (philosophical)  argumentation.  We  will  
therefore  refer  to  specific  passages  in  the  literature  only  occasionally,  and  especially  in  those  
cases  in  which  there  are  relevant  differences  not  only  of  presentation  but  also  in  the  way  the  
content  in  question  is  conceived.  For  general  information,  we  recommend  a  few   
14
introductory  texts:  in  English,  Bowell  &  Kemp  (2015),  Govier  (1988),  Lyons  &  Ward  (2018),  
and  Rosenberg  (1995);  in  German,  in  particular  the  two  essays  by  Betz  (2016)  and  Brun  
(2016)  from  the  Neues  Handbuch  des  Philosophie-Unterrichts  (Pfister  &  Zimmermann  2016)  
as  well  as  Brun  &  Hirsch  Hadorn  (2014),  Pfister  (2013),  and  Pfister  (2020).  
14  This  means,  among  other  things,  that  the  inference  rules  of  classical  logic  are  not  referenced   
individually  while  prominent  non-deductive  inference  forms  are,  since  e.g.,  analogical  inferences  are  
conceived  of  quite  differently  by  different  authors  (see  sections  6–7).  
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3.  Level  I:  Beginner  
The  primary  goal  of  an  argument  is  to  convince  oneself  or  others  that  a  statement  is  true,  or  
at  least  that  it  is  well-founded.  Sometimes  we  argue  directly  for  certain  statements.  At  other  
times,  we  explore  the  possible  implications  of  statements,  that  is,  we  argue  for  conditionals  
(for  instance,  “If  determinism  is  true,  then  we  have  no  free  will”).  At  level  I,  students  are  
introduced  to  this  conception  of  arguments  and  to  some  further  fundamental  aspects  of  the  
development,  interpretation,  and  evaluation  of  justifications  and  arguments.  Some  basic  
distinctions  play  an  important  role  here:  for  example,  the  one  between  declarative  
statements  and  other  linguistic  utterances  as  well  as  the  one  between  statements  which  are  
being  justified  and  those  which  serve  as  their  support.  Since  moral  questions  play  an  
important  role  in  the  teaching  of  philosophy  and  ethics,  this  is  also  where  we  introduce  the  
distinction  between  descriptive  and  non-descriptive  statements  (especially  normative  ones).  
This  distinction  prepares  students,  among  other  things,  for  an  examination  of  the  is-ought  
fallacy,  which  is  addressed  at  level  II.  
In  order  to  develop  the  core  argumentative  skills  of  level  I,  it  seems  natural  to  begin  by  
conveying  some  basic  knowledge.  Students  must  first  learn  to  distinguish  declarative  
statements  from  other  utterances  (X.I.1).  Unlike  questions,  cries  for  help,  or  commands,  
statements  are  used  to  claim  what  is  or  is  not  the  case.  Statements  can  be  either  true  or  
false,  independently  from  our  knowledge.  The  next  step  is  to  convey  the  ability  to  distinguish  
statements  which  form  the  body  of  an  argument  from  other  statements  in  which,  for  instance,  
a  mere  assertion  is  made  (B.I.1).  Students  thus  understand  the  basic  structure  of  
justifications  within  the  context  of  the  primary  goal  of  argumentation:  if  one  wants  to  convince  
oneself  or  others  of  the  truth  of  a  statement,  it  is  necessary  to  support  this  statement  with  at  
least  one  other  statement.  In  so  doing,  we  provide  a  justification  for  the  statement.  That  is,  
we  claim  that  the  statement  is  true  because  (an)other  statement(s)  is/are  true.  The  mere  
assertion  thus  becomes  a  justified  statement,  the  so-called  conclusion.  Any  further  
statements  used  for  justifying  this  conclusion  are  called  premises.  With  this  distinction  
between  premise(s)  and  conclusion  (X.I.3),  students  possess  the  basic  knowledge  needed  
to  understand  what  an  argument  is  (X.I.2,  B.I.2),  namely  a  justification  of  a  statement  (the  
conclusion)  by  one  or  more  different  statements  (the  premise(s)).  An  argument  therefore  
consists  of  three  elements:  the  conclusion,  the  premise(s)  and  the  supporting  or  justificatory  
relationship  between  the  two.  As  we  use  an  argument  to  claim  that  one  statement  is  true  
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because  one  or  more  other  statements  are  true,  we  infer  the  statement  in  need  of  
justification  from  the  justifying  statements.  (This  supporting  relationship  is  discussed  in  more  
detail  from  level  III  onwards.)  
Relations  of  justification  can  sometimes  be  easily  identified  by  means  of  specific  words,  
so-called  argumentation  indicators.  Words  such  as  "because”,  “since",  and  "due  to"  indicate  
a  justification.  Words  such  as  "consequently",  "therefore",  and  "thus"  refer  to  the  statement  
that  is  to  be  justified,  that  is,  the  statement  whose  truth  is  meant  to  be  supported  by  the  
justifying  statement(s).  Students  develop  the  competence  to  justify  their  own  statements,  
using  words  that  indicate  an  argumentation  (A.I.1).  
At  this  basic  level,  it  is  also  advisable  to  introduce  a  further  distinction  within  the  group  of  
statements,  namely  the  aforementioned  distinction  between  descriptive  and  non-descriptive,  
and,  in  particular,  normative  statements  (X.I.4,  B.I.3).  Normative  statements  include  
statements  that  something  should  or  should  not  be  the  case,  for  example  in  moral  terms.   
15
For  such  statements,  some  philosophers  use  the  concept  of  correctness  rather  than  that  of  
truth.  This  goes  back  to  the  view  that  normative  statements  do  not  make  assertions  about  
the  world  the  same  way  as  descriptive  statements  do  and  that  normative  statements  cannot  
be  true  or  false.  However,  we  can  bracket  this  controversy  here.  In  ordinary  language,  after  
all,  we  can  call  normative  statements  such  as  "Killing  is  wrong"  true  or  false  rather  
unproblematically.  Partly  on  this  basis,  we  will  also  characterize  normative  arguments  in  
terms  of  the  truth  of  the  premises  supporting  the  truth  of  the  conclusion.  All  the  same,  
teachers  are  of  course  free  to  introduce  an  additional  distinction  between  "truth"  and  
"correctness"  here.  We  intend  to  keep  our  proposals  neutral  with  respect  to  questions  of  
metaethics  and  the  philosophy  of  normativity.  Where  we  may  fail  at  this,  we  trust  our  
charitable  readers  to  suitably  adapt  our  ideas.  
Knowledge  of  statement-types  and  a  basic  understanding  of  argumentative  structures  are  
vital  for  the  development  of  one's  own  arguments  as  well  as  for  the  interpretation  of  
arguments  put  forward  by  others.  At  this  level,  in  addition  to  introducing  students  to  ways  of  
recognizing  and  using  arguments  in  texts  and  conversations,  we  also  introduce  a  first  form  of  
evaluating  arguments.  Since  it  can  be  assumed  that  the  students  already  have  intuitive  
access  to  the  content  of  the  justifications  that  are  provided,  it  makes  sense  to  first  consider  
15  For  school  teaching,  this  is  the  most  prominent  form  of  normativity,  so  it  is  our  focus  here.  However,   
the  remarks  can  just  as  easily  be  applied  to  other  areas,  such  as  aesthetic  or  epistemic  normativity.  
The  group  of  non-descriptive  statements  includes  normative,  evaluative,  and  prescriptive  statements,  
although  the  particulars  of  these  categories  and  their  relationships  to  each  other  are  understood  
differently  (see,  e.g.,  Henning  2019,  pp.  29 – 35).   
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the  relevance  of  this  content  in  its  respective  context.  Students  thereby  acquire  or  deepen  
their  ability  to  decide  whether  a  statement  or  argument  made  is  relevant  to  the  topic  at  hand  
(C.I.1).  
4.  Level  II:  Basic  
Once  students  have  been  introduced  to  some  background  knowledge  and  the  basic  skills  of  
argumentation,  these  are  deepened  at  level  II.  They  learn  to  present  and  reconstruct  
arguments  in  standard  form  as  well  as  to  examine  arguments  in  view  of  their  completeness.  
Furthermore,  they  learn  to  recognize  some  fallacies.  
Acquiring  the  ability  to  reconstruct  arguments  in  standard  form  (X.II.1)  is  fundamental  to  the  
development,  interpretation,  and  evaluation  of  arguments.  With  respect  to  the  core   
16
competence  of  interpreting  arguments,  we  propose  a  two-step  process.  The  first  step  
consists  in  converting  statements  from  contributions  that  contain  complete  arguments  into  
standard  form  (B.II.1).  In  so  doing,  statements  are  identified  as  premises  and  conclusions  
(including  intermediate  conclusions),  usually  in  the  form  of  a  list  with  the  appropriate  
designations.  An  argument  with  two  premises  and  one  conclusion,  for  instance,  would  take  
on  the  following  standard  form:  
1. Statement  (premise  1)  
2. Statement  (premise  2)  
  
3. Statement  (conclusion)  
There  are  various  equally  suitable  conventions  in  use  to  designate  premise(s)  and  
conclusions,  for  instance,  a  list  with  “P1”  and  “C”  instead  of  the  remarks  in  brackets  or  three  
points  rather  than  a  line  to  indicate  the  conclusion  (see,  for  instance,  Henle,  Garfield  &  
Tymoczko  2012,  Tetens  2006).  Graphic  representations  in  the  form  of  diagrams  or  maps  can  
also  be  helpful  here,  whether  with  boxes  (filled  with  individual  statements)  or  connecting  
arrows  (for  supporting  relationships).  Both  individual  arguments  can  be  presented  in  this  way  
–  as  an  alternative  to  the  standard  form  (see  Harrell  2012,  p.  32)  –  as  well  as  relationships  
between  several  arguments  –  as  an  extension  of  the  standard  form  (see  Betz  2016).  We  will  
deal  with  this  option  in  more  detail  in  section 5.  
16  Valuable  tips  on  reconstructing  arguments  in  standard  form  can  be  found  e.g.  in  Betz  (2016),  sect.   
5.3,  Brun  (2016),  pp.  262–267,  Brun  &  Hirsch  Hadorn  (2014),  sect.  8.2,  D'Agostini  (2010),  ch.  4,  
Govier  (1988),  ch.  2,  esp.  pp.  23f.,  Tetens  (2006),  ch.  6.  
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In  a  second  step,  students  reconstruct  arguments  in  standard  form  from  text  passages  that  
contain  incomplete  arguments  (B.II.2,  B.II.3).  In  this  way,  they  become  familiar  with  the  need  
for  completeness  in  argument  reconstructions  (X.II.3)  and  understand  that  superfluous  
premises  must  be  removed  while  an  implicit  conclusion  as  well  as  implicit  or  missing  
premises  must  be  added  (X.II.4).  
The  requirement  of  completeness  does  not  only  apply  to  the  interpretation  of  the  arguments  
of  others  but  also  to  the  development  of  one's  own  arguments.  By  performing  complete  
reconstructions  of  their  own  arguments,  students  improve  their  clarity  and  precision  (A.II.1).  
This  also  makes  it  easier  for  them  to  write  texts  with  a  clear  argumentative  structure  (A.II.2),  
which  in  turn  makes  it  as  easy  as  possible  for  others  to  reconstruct  the  arguments  according  
to  their  intended,  complete  structure.  
The  sub-competences  of  the  interpretation  of  arguments  flow  quite  naturally  into  the  
sub-competences  for  evaluating  arguments,  in  which  the  requirement  of  completeness  also  
plays  a  special  role.  Until  this  point,  students  have  evaluated  whether  a  statement  or  an  
argument  is  relevant  for  a  certain  topic  only  in  an  intuitive  way  (C.I.1).  Now,  in  a  first  step  
forward,  they  evaluate  whether  a  given  argument  is  relevant  to  a  given  statement  and,  if  so,  
whether  the  argument  either  supports,  criticizes  or  remains  neutral  with  respect  to  that  
statement  (C.II.1).  In  a  second  step,  they  learn  to  evaluate  an  argument  with  regard  to  its  
completeness  and  possible  redundancy  (C.II.2).  Only  then  can  passages  with  incomplete 
arguments  be  reconstructed  into  complete  arguments  by  adding  premises,  as  mentioned  
above.  
In  this  context,  it  is  crucial  that  students  understand  and  take  to  heart  the  principle  of  charity  
(X.II.2).  In  general,  the  principle  states  that  an  argument  should  be  interpreted  and 
reconstructed  in  the  strongest  way  possible,  given  the  wording  and  the  context  of  the  
discussion  in  which  it  is  embedded.  All  interpretive  decisions  that  render  the  argument  
unnecessarily  implausible  should  be  avoided.  This  includes  efforts  to  arrive  at  an  adequate  
formulation  of  the  content  as  well  as  the  complete  reconstruction  of  the  argument,  in  which  
all  and  only  the  relevant  premises  are  included.  (We  expand  on  this  aspect  from  level  III  
onwards.)  Relevant  premises  that  remain  implicit  should  be  added,  provided  that  the  person  
making  the  argument  can  be  presumed  to  accept  them  (X.II.4).  Among  other  things,  a  
charitable  interpretation  can  prevent  a  reconstruction  of  an  argument  as  a  so-called  straw  
man  argument,  that  is  an  argument  which  can  be  easily  refuted  but  no  longer  corresponds  to  
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the  argument  originally  put  forward.  The  stronger  one  reconstructs  an  argument  on  behalf  of  
its  proponents,  the  more  convincing  a  possible  criticism  will  be.  
Once  students  have  become  familiar  with  the  requirement  for  completeness  in  arguments,  it  
is  appropriate  to  introduce  a  distinction  between  two  types  of  criticism  (C.II.3):  on  the  one  
hand,  criticism  of  the  contents  of  the  premises  and,  on  the  other  hand,  criticism  of  the  form  of  
arguments  (for  instance,  that  they  must  be  complete).  The  second  type  of  criticism  is  
explained  in  more  detail  from  level  III  onwards  (see  section  6.1),  when  deductive  and  
non-deductive  arguments  as  well  as  fallacies  are  addressed.  The  fundamental  concepts  of  
(deductive)  validity  and  soundness  of  arguments  (X.III.2)  can  also  be  introduced  already  at  
this  point.  In  any  case,  at  level  II,  it  is  already  possible  and  appropriate  to  familiarize  students  
with  certain  fallacies  and  other  argumentation  errors.  This  applies  in  particular  to  those  
errors  that  concern  the  relevance  of  the  premises  for  the  conclusion  and  the  completeness  
of  arguments,  for  instance,  the  ignoratio  elenchi  (missing  the  point),  the  petitio  principii  
(begging  the  question,  assuming  what  is  to  be  demonstrated)  and  the  is-ought  fallacy  
(C.II.4),  all  of  which  we  will  briefly  characterize  here.   
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The  ignoratio  elenchi  is  closely  related  to  the  straw  man  argument  described  above.  In  the  
case  of  this  error  of  argumentation,  a  different  conclusion  is  justified  than  was  originally  at  
issue.  This  error  also  sets  in  when,  instead  of  properly  refuting  the  premise  of  a  given  
argument  (see  also  section  5),  this  premise  is  incorrectly  reproduced,  such  that  the  new  
argument  fails  to  hit  its  target.  Such  an  argument  is  therefore  not  relevant  to  the  subject  or  
the  thesis  in  question,  after  all.  
The  other  two  errors  of  argumentation,  the  petitio  principii  and  the  is-ought  fallacy,  concern  
the  completeness  of  an  argument,  each  in  their  own  way.  In  the  case  of  a  petitio  principii ,  the  
conclusion  to  be  justified  is  either  explicitly  or  implicitly  presupposed  by  one  of  the  premises.  
In  a  formal  sense,  a  circular  argument  is  not  a  problem,  because  everything  follows  from  
itself.  What  is  problematic,  however,  is  that  the  truth  of  the  conclusion  is  presupposed  by  the  
premise  in  question,  which  nullifies  the  justificatory  function  of  the  premise  for  the  
conclusion.  Those  who  are  not  already  convinced  by  the  conclusion  will  also  reject  the  
premise  in  question.  The  other  premises,  for  their  part,  are  not  sufficient  to  infer  the  
conclusion.  
17  For  a  discussion  of  fallacies  and  argumentation  errors  in  general  as  well  as  their  background  in   
cognitive  science  and  their  importance  in  the  context  of  public  debates,  see,  e.g.,  Brun  &  Hirsch  
Hadorn  (2014),  pp.  302–311,  Coliva  &  Lalumera  (2006),  ch.  4,  D'Agostini  (2012),  part  IV,  Govier  
(1988),  pp.  328–332,  Iacona  (2005),  part  IV,  Lyons  &  Ward  (2018),  Pfister  (2013),  sect..  1.8,  Pfister  
(2020),  ch.  21.  
   13  
An  argument  that  contains  an  is-ought  fallacy  is  incomplete  in  a  different  way.  This  mistake   
18
occurs  when  a  normative  conclusion  is  inferred  from  purely  descriptive  premises.  This  
means  that  purely  descriptive  statements  about  what  is  the  case  are  used  to  infer,  for  
example,  what  ought  to  be  the  case  or  whether  it  is  good .  The  normative  content  of  the  
conclusion,  however,  is  precisely  what  remains  to  be  justified  by  the  premises.  Without  at  
least  one  relevant  normative  premise  the  argument  cannot  make  this  leap.  In  this  sense,  it  is  
incomplete.  An  is-ought  fallacy  can  be  easily  amended  by  adding  a  suitable  normative  
premise.  Then,  of  course,  this  added  premise  can  be  closely  examined  and  possibly  refuted.  
Being  able  to  add  normative  premises  which  otherwise  would  have  remained  implicit  and  
thereby  to  allow  for  their  explicit  and  critical  discussion  is  a  very  important  competence,  
which  results  from  a  combination  of  the  sub-competences  presented  at  this  level.  
5.  Optional  Branching  Point:  Arguing  within  a  
Discussion  
After  students  have  acquired  the  basic  skills  for  the  development,  interpretation,  and  
evaluation  of  individual  arguments  at  level  II,  these  competences  can  be  enriched  with  more  
specific  elements,  which,  among  other  things,  deepen  their  ability  to  argue  within  a  
discussion  context .  After  all,  single  arguments  are  always  embedded  in  discussions  in  which  
various  questions  and  further  arguments  are  being  negotiated.  In  this  regard,  we  rely  on  a  
helpful  overview  of  this  topic  by  Gregor  Betz  (2016).  The  relevant  competences  (see  
sections  5.1  and  5.2)  can  be  incorporated  quite  flexibly  at  various  points.  For  instance,  they  
can  
1. either  branch  out  directly  from  level  II  without  touching  upon  the  contents  of  levels  III  
and  IV,  or  
2. be  fully  discussed  only  in  connection  to  levels  III  or  IV,  or  even  
18  The  is-ought  fallacy  is  sometimes  also  referred  to  as  the  naturalistic  fallacy.  However,  this  wrongly   
suggests  that  normative  conclusions  would  only  be  problematic  if  they  were  drawn  from  descriptive  
statements,  e.g.  about  natural  facts.  Regardless  of  the  content  of  the  premises,  however,  any  
transition  from  purely  descriptive  premises  to  normative  conclusions  is  problematic.  The  designation  
"is-ought  fallacy"  is  imprecise  as  well,  since  it  suggests  that  only  the  inference  from  purely  descriptive  
premises  to  ought-statements  is  problematic,  whereas  this  also  applies  to  inferences  to  evaluative  
and  prescriptive  statements  (see  fn.  15).  However,  we  stick  to  this  established  name  as  an  umbrella  
term  here.  
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3. be  divided  between  levels  III  and  IV,  without  being  more  closely  connected  with  the  
other  contents  of  these  levels.  
Overall,  we  find  the  third  option  to  be  somewhat  more  feasible  than  the  first  two,  given  that  
the  relevant  single  competences  for  arguing  within  the  context  of  a  discussion  exhibit  various  
levels  of  complexity  themselves.  In  particular  cases,  however,  the  other  two  options  may  be  
better.  The  appendix  subdivides  the  relevant  competences  between  levels  III  and  IV.  From  
level  II  onwards,  it  also  includes  references  to  these  competences  in  order  to  clearly  
demarcate  this  branching  out  within  the  logic  of  argumentative  competences  without  
unnecessarily  overcomplicating  the  table.  By  explaining  the  specific  individual  competences  
in  this  separate  section,  however,  we  follow  their  thematic  connections  more  closely.  
5.1  Coherence  and  Overview  
The  first  step  for  arguing  within  the  context  of  a  debate  revolves  around  the  concepts  of  
contradiction,  consistency,  and  coherence  (X.III.7)  and  can  be  found  at  level  III  within  our  
proposal.  There  it  may,  for  instance,  be  connected  with  the  topic  of  the  (deductive)  validity  of  
arguments,  in  which  accepting  the  premises  and  rejecting  the  conclusion  would  represent  a  
contradiction  (see  Sections  6.1,  6.3).  
Students  improve  their  competences  in  developing  their  own  arguments  by  dealing  with  
potential  contradictions  in  the  totality  of  the  statements  and  arguments  they  have  made  
(A.III.3).  They  develop  new  arguments  with  a  special  focus  on  examining  potential  tensions  
and  dissonances  and,  when  possible,  resolve  them  if  they  actually  arise.   
19
These  skills  also  play  a  role  in  the  interpretation  of  the  arguments  of  others:  students  
evaluate  the  extent  to  which  a  certain  argument  coheres  with  other  arguments,  for  example,  
with  those  which  their  proponent  has  already  endorsed  (C.III.3).  This  further  develops  the  
competences  of  interpretation  and  reconstruction  covered  in  level  II.  For  instance,  when  
applying  the  principle  of  charity  (X.II.2),  students  learn  to  consider  the  broader  argumentative  
context  in  order  to  avoid  careless  attributions  of  contradictions  and  instead  explore  
alternative  avenues  of  interpretation.   
In  addition,  at  this  stage  students  develop  the  ability  to  identify  the  central  theses  of  longer  
texts  and  discussions,  to  recognize  individual  arguments  for  or  against  them,  and  to  
19  This  also  plays  a  special  role  in  philosophy  and  ethics  education  in  general  (see,  e.g.,  Barz  2019,   
Burkard  et  al.  2018,  and  Henke  2015).  
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reconstruct  them  in  their  own  words  (B.III.3).  Students  do  not  only  work  on  simple  pro-con 
lists  but  reconstruct  individual  elements  from  these  lists  as  arguments  with  their  own  internal  
structure.  
5.2  Mapping  and  Diagnosis  
The  second  step  is  classified  in  level  IV  in  our  proposal  and  includes  a  more  detailed  
analysis  of  the  relationships  between  arguments  (X.IV.4),  especially  of  the  support-  and  the  
so-called  attack-relations  which  are  defined  as  follows  (see  for  instance,  Betz  2016,  p.   
20
189):  
● An  argument  supports  another  argument  if  and  only  if  the  conclusion  of  the  
supporting  argument  corresponds  exactly  to  one  of  the  premises  of  the  supported  
argument.  
● An  argument  attacks  another  argument  if  and  only  if  the  conclusion  of  the  attacking  
argument  corresponds  exactly  to  the  negation  of  one  of  the  premises  of  the  attacked  
argument.  
With  these  conceptual  tools,  students  can  practice  interpreting  first  shorter  and  then  also  
longer  texts  and  discussions  in  such  a  way  that  they  not  only  distill  the  arguments  for  and  
against  a  specific  thesis  (B.III.3)  but  also  create  so-called  “reason  hierarchies”  or  
“debate-maps”  (B.IV.3).  That  is,  among  other  things,  they  can  practice  distinguishing  
"first-level"  arguments  for  or  against  a  core  thesis  from  the  "second-level"  support  and  
objections  related  to  them,  etc.  Visualizations  are  quite  suitable  for  this  purpose,  whether  on  
posters  or  with  the  aid  of  specialized  software  (see  for  example  https://argdown.org/).  
This  mapping  competence  is  closely  linked  to  another  competence  within  the  field  of  
evaluation  (C.IV.3).  In  the  light  of  possible  indirect  connections  between  different  arguments,  
students  now  also  evaluate  to  what  extent  a  new  argument  in  a  debate  context  is  suitable  to  
indirectly  strengthen  or  weaken  a  certain  central  thesis  or  position.  They  also  consider  other  
mediated  relationships  that  can  arise  between  arguments.  For  example:  
20  The  warlike  imagery  of  the  term  “attack”  is  anything  but  unproblematic  (see  e.g.,  Cohen  1995).  We   
retain  the  established  technical  term  for  this  attack  relation  due  to  a  lack  of  better  alternatives.  Still,  we  
would  like  to  point  out  that  it  concerns  attacks  on  statements  and  not  on  persons  (see  the  
argumentation  error  ad  hominem )  and  that  such  attacks,  i.e.,  arguments  against  specific  premises  of  
other  arguments,  are  an  indispensable  part  also  and  particularly  of  the  common  search  for  knowledge  
in  friendly,  constructive  discussions.  
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● the  indirect  strengthening  of  a  thesis  or  of  an  argument,  for  instance  by  countering  an  
objection  to  it,  
● the  indirect  weakening  of  a  thesis  or  an  argument,  for  instance  by  criticizing  
arguments  that  support  it,  
● the  possible  circularity  of  chains  of  supporting  arguments  –  also  in  contradistinction  
to  the  petitio  principii  (X.II.5).  
Such  insights  also  affect  the  core  competence  of  developing  one's  own  arguments.  Students  
can  now  reflectively  formulate  and  express  their  arguments  in  such  a  way  that  they,  for  
instance,  indirectly  support  their  own  statements  and  arguments  or  that  they  indirectly  
criticize  competing  statements  or  arguments  (A.IV.3).  
6.  Level  III:  Intermediate  
At  the  intermediate  level  III,  previously  developed  competences  are  extended  to  more  
fine-grained  elements  of  the  analysis  of  arguments.  The  focus  here  lies  on  becoming  able  to  
more  precisely  evaluate  the  strength  of  single  arguments  regarding  their  form.  Furthermore,  
this  level  focuses  on  incorporating  these  competences  in  the  interpretation  of  arguments  put  
forward  by  others  as  well  as  in  the  formulation  of  one's  own  arguments.  In  addition,  further  
competences  from  the  domain  of  argumentation  in  a  debate  context  can  be  integrated  here  
(see  Section  5,  esp.  5.1).  
6.1.  Specifying  the  Strength  of  Support  in  Arguments  
The  starting  point  for  the  steps  taken  here  is  the  rather  intuitive  concept  of  the  completeness  
of  arguments  and  their  reconstructions  which  the  students  have  worked  with  so  far  (X.II.3).  
Now  we  will  take  a  closer  look  at  what  "completeness"  consists  in.  We  will  therefore  clarify  
the  impression  students  already  have  that  certain  premises  guarantee  a  certain  conclusion.  
Students  understand  that  what  matters  here  is  the  form  of  the  argument  and  the  rules  that  
underlie  the  inferences  (X.III.1).  Thus,  evaluating  the  plausibility  of  single  arguments  is  
closely  tied  to  the  evaluation  of  the  plausibility  of  arguments  with  the  same  structure.  Given  
this  background,  the  concept  of  completeness  is  now  refined  by  way  of  two  new  concepts:   
1. (deductive)  validity  (X.III.2)  –  understood  as  the  property  of  an  argument  such  that  
the  conclusion  must  be  true  provided  that  all  premises  are  also  true  since  there  is  no  
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structurally  identical  argument  whose  premises  are  true  but  whose  conclusion  is  
false.   
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2. non-deductive  strength  (X.III.3)  –  understood  as  the  property  of  an  argument  to  not  
be  (deductively)  valid,  but  nevertheless  to  create  a  strong  transfer  of  plausibility  from  
the  premises  to  the  conclusion  through  its  argumentative  structure.  
In  the  context  of  teaching,  these  abstract  categories  referring  to  the  forms  of  arguments  and  
principles  of  inference  should  be  conveyed  in  connection  with  concrete  examples.  It  may  
also  be  appropriate  to  ask  students  to  extract  the  abstract  categories  from  the  examples  
given  below.  They  are  accordingly  divided  into  examples  of  deductive  (section  6.3)  and  of  
non-deductive  forms  of  arguments  and  inference  rules  (section  6.4).  However,  in  presenting  
these  argument  forms  in  separate  subsections,  we  do  not  propose  any  order  for  teaching  
and  learning  of  deductive  and  non-deductive  inferences.  Level  III  conveys  the  most  common  
and  fundamental  forms  of  inference.  Level  IV  (advanced)  addresses  more  complex  ones.  To  
begin  with,  however,  section  6.2  provides  a  general  background  by  relating  the  above  
considerations  to  the  three  core  argumentative  competences  our  framework  is  meant  to  
further.  
6.2  Argument  Forms  and  Argumentative  Competences  
The  new  content  of  level  III  revolves  around  the  familiarization  with  specific  forms  of  
arguments  which  relate  to  corresponding  background  concepts.  In  what  follows,  we  explain 
how  these  forms  of  arguments  are  central  to  all  three  core  competences.   
In  interpreting  arguments,  students  acquire  the  ability  to  recognize  the  relevant  deductive  
and  non-deductive  inference  rules  for  arguments  and  to  reconstruct  them  accordingly  
(B.III.1,  B.III.2).  That  is,  they  learn  to  detect  the  structures  of  these  inferences  more  easily  
and  become  better  at  formulating  premises  in  the  reconstruction  of  an  argument  in  such  a  
way  that  the  inference  rules  are  more  clearly  recognizable  (building  on  B.II.1),  for  instance  
by  adding  implicit  premisses  (building  on  B.II.2)  
21  On  this  basis,  the  notion  of  soundness  can  also  be  introduced,  understood  as  the  property  of  an   
argument  to  be  both  (deductively)  valid  and  to  have  only  true  or  plausible  premises.  In  this  context,  
some  German  texts  also  use  “Schlüssigkeit”  (see  e.g.,  Rosenkranz  2006,  van  Riel  &  Vosgerau  2018)  
or  “Beweiskräftigkeit”  (see  e.g.,  Strobach  2011).  The  term  “validity”  is  also  called  “Schlüssigkeit”  in  
some  texts  (see  e.g.,  Tetens  2006).  As  long  as  the  terms  are  appropriately  determined  and  do  not  
cause  confusion,  various  labeling  decisions  are  of  course  unproblematic.  
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In  evaluating  arguments,  students  acquire  the  ability  to  assess  those  arguments  more  
precisely  which  exhibit  a  form  which  either  corresponds  to  the  relevant  deductive  or  
non-deductive  inference  pattern  (the  positive  case)  or  deviates  from  it  in  characteristic  ways.  
In  this  latter,  negative  case,  one  can  speak  of  deductive  fallacies  or  weak  non-deductive  
inferences  (C.III.1,  C.III.2).  
These  competences  in  evaluation  are,  in  turn,  closely  connected  to  the  competences  in  
interpretation  presented  above.  For  if  an  argument  seems  to  involve  a  fallacy,  one  must,  
according  to  the  principle  of  charity  (X.II.2),  consider  the  broader  context  and  seek  
alternative  possible  reconstructions  which  make  the  argument  more  plausible  than  its  
perhaps  simply  inaccurate  wording  suggests.  In  the  presentation  of  the  forms  of  inference  in  
the  following  sections,  we  use  the  keyword  "charitable  reconstruction"  to  mention  relevant  
aspects  which  students  may  consider  in  their  interpretations.  In  addition,  when  we  introduce  
a  fallacy,  we  also  provide  a  suitable  example  in  which  the  corresponding  premises  are  
clearly  true  but  the  corresponding  conclusion  is  clearly  false. 
In  developing  arguments,  students  acquire  the  ability  to  reflectively  apply  the  relevant  
deductive  and  non-deductive  reasoning  principles  in  their  own  arguments  (A.III.1,  A.III.2).  
That  is,  they  learn  to  make  use  of  their  knowledge  of  the  justificatory  power  of  a  given  
argument  form  when  finding  their  own  arguments  and  to  elucidate  this  structure,  whether  
orally  or  in  writing,  in  such  a  way  that  the  persuasive  power  of  their  arguments  is  clearly  
strengthened  (building  on  A.II.2).  
6.3  Deductive  Inferences  
The  deductive  inferences  of  level  III  can  be  divided  into  two  groups.  The  first  group  includes  
conditionals  ("if-then-sentences")  and  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  expressed  
therein  (X.III.4).  The  distinction  between  these  two  types  of  conditions  is  therefore  as  central  
here  as  the  notion  of  a  conditional  itself  and  the  different  ways  in  which  conditionals  can  be  
expressed  (for  instance,  "if"  vs.  "only  if").  Included  here  are  both  the  simple,  propositional  
form  ("if  p,  then  q")  and  the  commonly  encountered  universally  quantified  form,  the  general  
conditional  (for  instance,  "Everything  that  is  F  is  G")  (X.III.5).  Accordingly,  at  this  point,  
students  grasp  three  particular  inference  rules  (1–3)  along  with  the  fallacies  associated  with  
them  (4–5).  Through  the  interplay  of  universal  instantiation  and  modus  ponens ,  one  can  
reconstruct,  among  other  things,  those  arguments  in  which  general  moral  principles  are  
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applied  to  specific  cases.  These  rightly  play  an  important  role  in  philosophy  and  ethics  
classes,  often  under  the  name  of  "practical  syllogism"  (see  Althoff  2016a,  among  others).  
1. Modus  ponens :  "if  p,  then  q"  and  "p"  entail  "q".  
2. Modus  tollens :  "if  p,  then  q"  and  "not  q"  entail  "not  p".  
3. Universal  instantiation :  What  is  true  for  everything  is  also  true  for  some  arbitrary  
individual,  for  instance:  "everything  that  is  F  is  G"  entails  "if  a  is  F,  then  a  is  G".  
4. Affirming  the  consequent :  "if  p,  then  q"  and  "q"  does  not  entail  "p".  
Example :  "When  I  sleep,  I  lie  down.  I  lie  down.  But  I  do  not  sleep.  (I  read  and  lie  on  
the  sofa.)"  
Charitable  reconstruction :  Is  the  affirmed  condition  merely  necessary  or  is  it  also  
sufficient?  If  the  latter,  it  is  a  valid  modus  ponens  and  not  a  fallacy.  
5. Denying  the  antecedent :  "if  p,  then  q"  and  "not  p"  do  not  entail  “not  q".  
Example :  "When  I  sleep,  I  lie  down.  I  do  not  sleep.  But  I  lie  down.  (I  read  and  lie  on  
the  sofa.)"  
Charitable  reconstruction :  Is  the  negated  condition  merely  sufficient  or  is  it  also  
necessary?  If  the  latter,  it  is  a  valid  modus  tollens  and  not  a  fallacy.  
The  second  group  comprises  disjunctions  and  exclusive  disjunctions,  that  is,  statements  with  
an  inclusive  or  exclusive  "or"  (X.III.6).  Here,  too,  we  consider  various  linguistic  expressions  
(for  instance,  "either"  does  not  necessarily  have  an  exclusionary  effect)  and  we  consider  
valid  inferential  principles  (6–7)  as  well  as  false  inferences  (8–9).  
6. Disjunctive  syllogism :  "p  or  q"  and  "not  p"  entail  "q".  
7. Exclusive  disjunctive  syllogism :  "p  or  q,  but  not  both"  and  "p"  entail  "not  q"  
8. False  alternative  (also:  incomplete  disjunction) :  Arguments  with  disjunctions  as  
premises  are  only  convincing  if  the  disjunction  mentions  all  relevant  or  possible  
cases.  If  not,  the  disjunction  is  incomplete.  This  is,  however,  not  a  criticism  of  the  
validity  of  the  argument  itself,  that  is,  not  a  fallacy  in  the  narrow  sense,  but  a  criticism  
of  the  premise  in  question.  
Example :  In  the  case  of  the  disjunctive  syllogism,  for  example:  The  argument,  "Either  
I  will  become  rich  or  I  will  become  grinding  poor.  I  will  not  become  grinding  poor.  
Thus,  I  will  become  rich."  is  flawed  because  it  assumes  an  incomplete  disjunction.  In  
addition  to  "I  will  become  rich"  and  "I  will  become  grinding  poor,"  there  are  other  
options.  
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Charitable  reconstruction :  Have  the  additional  options,  which  would  also  have  to  be  
inserted  into  the  disjunction,  not  been  mentioned  elsewhere?   
9. False  exclusive  disjunctive  syllogism :  "p  or  q"  and  "p"  do  not  entail  "not  q".  
Erexample :  "Either  Mom  or  Dad  come  to  pick  you  up.  Dad  comes  to  pick  you  up.  
Still,  it  is  not  true  that  Mom  does  not  come  to  pick  you  up.  (Both  come.)"  
Charitable  reconstruction :  Is  the  "or"  statement  really  appropriately  reconstructed  as  
an  inclusive  disjunction?  If  an  exclusive  disjunction  is  appropriate,  then  the  
conclusion  is  a  valid  exclusive  disjunctive  syllogism.  
In  light  of  these  examples  of  valid  inferences  (1–3,  6–7),  the  general  notion  of  (deductive)  
validity  (X.III.2)  mentioned  in  Section  6.1  becomes  much  more  tangible  for  students.  The  
examples  above  are  well  suited  to  accompany  the  notion  of  deductive  reasoning  as  prime  
examples.  They  do  this,  inter  alia ,  by  providing  a  particularly  clear  illustration  of  how  
accepting  the  premises  in  question  while  simultaneously  rejecting  the  conclusion  would  lead  
to  a  contradiction.   
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6.4  Non-deductive  Inferences  
We  have  grouped  three  non-deductive  inferences  here  at  level  III  because  they  are  both  
frequent  and  accessible.  They  can  be  taken  up  and  taught  in  any  order.  Similarly,  they  can  
be  flexibly  supplemented  by  other  argument  patterns  which  are  sufficiently  relevant  but  not  
too  complex.  For  each  of  the  three  non-deductive  inference  patterns  we  also  mention  
suitable  avenues  of  criticism  which  go  beyond  the  simple  and  uninformative  remark  that  they  
are  invalid.  
10. Generalization,  understood  as  the  inference  from  specific  to  general  statements   
23
(X.III.5),  in  simple  variants,  for  instance  from  "the  known  /  investigated  things  of  kind  
F  exhibit  property  G"  to  "everything  that  is  F  is  G".  
Possible  criticism :  for  instance:  (a)  The  unknown  /  unexamined  things  of  kind  F  differ  
from  the  known  /  examined  ones  in  a  way  relevant  to  property  G.  (b)  We  had 
categorically  excluded  everything  that  is  not  G  from  being  F,  but  maybe  that  was  
22  This  is  not  only  a  further  development  of  the  notion  of  (deductive)  validity  by  means  of  the  notion  of   
contradiction  but  at  the  same  time  also  the  basis  for  the  development  of  an  independent  notion  of  
logical  consistency  (X.III.7).  This  is  the  basis  for  a  further  competence  in  the  evaluation  of  arguments  
in  a  debate  context  (C.III.3,  see  section  5.1).  
23  See,  e.g.,  Bowell  &  Kemp  (2015),  pp.  111 – 116,  159 – 162,  Brun  &  Hirsch  Hadorn  (2014),  pp.   
277 – 290,  Govier  (1988),  pp.  255f.,  Lyons  &  Ward  (2018),  sect.  4.3,  Pfister  (2013),  sect.  1.3,  and  the             
more  complex  variants  in  Level  IV.  
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wrong?  (Example:  We  had  categorically  excluded  everything  non-white  from  being  a  
swan.)  
11. Inference  to  the  best  explanation  in  a  simple  form,  for  instance,  understood  as  the   
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inference  from  "p"  and  "q  is  the  best  explanation  for  p"  to  "q".   
Possible  criticism :  for  instance:  There  is  another,  better  explanation  for  "p".  
12. Argument  by  analogy  in  a  simple  form,  for  instance,  understood  as  the  inference   
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from  "p  is  the  case  in  domain  A"  and  "the  domains  A  and  B  are  analogous,  such  that  
the  state  of  affairs  p  in  A  corresponds  to  the  state  of  affairs  q  in  B"  to  "q  is  the  case  in  
domain  B".   
Possible  criticism :  Domains  A  and  B  are  disanalogous  in  relevant  respects.  Or:  In  the  
analogy  between  these  domains,  the  state  of  affairs  p  in  A  does  not  correspond  to  
the  state  of  affairs  q  in  B.   
In  light  of  these  examples  of  strong  non-deductive  inferences,  the  general  notion  of  the  
non-deductive  strength  of  arguments  (X.III.3)  mentioned  in  section  6.1  becomes  much  more  
tangible  for  students.  The  examples  listed  here  are  well  suited  to  accompany  the  notion  of  
non-deductive  strength  as  prime  examples.  
7.  Level  IV:  Advanced  
Level  IV  closely  follows  level  III  in  terms  of  content  and  structure.  Here,  too,  background  
concepts  in  the  form  of  important  deductive  and  non-deductive  forms  of  reasoning  play  an  
important  role,  especially  in  that  they  expand  upon  the  three  core  argumentative  
competences  of  developing,  interpreting,  and  evaluating  arguments.  These  relationships  
were  presented  in  detail  in  section  6.2  for  level  III  and  are  much  the  same  in  level  IV.  
Accordingly,  we  begin  by  presenting  the  deductive  inference  rules  that  are  grouped  here  
(section  7.1),  followed  by  the  non-deductive  argument  forms,  again  in  connection  with  
related  fallacies  and  errors  of  argumentation  (section  7.2).  In  addition,  further  competences  
in  argumentation  within  a  debate  context  can  also  be  integrated  here  (see  section  5,  esp.  
5.2).  
24  See,  e.g.,  Bowell  &  Kemp  (2015),  pp.  167 – 169,  Govier  (1988),  Lyons  &  Ward  (2018),  sect  4.5 ,  pp.            
257 – 259,  Pfister  (2013),  sect  3.7,  Pfister  (2020),  ch.  15,  Walton  et  al.  (2008),  pp.  10,  207,  as  well  as  
the  more  complex  variants  in  level  IV.  
25  See,  e.g.,  Brun  &  Hirsch  Hadorn  (2014),  pp.  294 – 299,  Govier  (1988),  ch.  10,  Löwenstein  (2015),   
Lyons  &  Ward  (2018),  sect  4.4 ,  Pfister  (2013),  sect  3.5,  Tetens  (2006),  ch.  15,  Walton  et  al.  (2008),  ch.           
2,  as  well  as  the  more  complex  variants  in  level  IV.  
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7.1  More  complex  Deductive  Inferences  
Level  IV's  more  complex  deductive  inferences  can  be  divided  into  two  groups.  The  first 
group  consists  of  the  inference  rules  13–16.  They  often  occur  together  and  should  therefore  
ideally  be  taught  together  (the  interaction  of  15  and  16,  for  example,  covers  numerous  
classical  syllogisms).  
13. Transitivity :  "if  p,  then  q"  and  "if  q,  then  r"  entail  "if  p,  then  r".  
14. Contraposition :  "if  p,  then  q"  entails  "if  not  q,  then  not  p".  
15. Universal  transitivity :  "Everything  that  is  F  is  G"  and  "Everything  that  is  G  is  H"  entail  
"Everything  that  is  F  is  H".  
16. Universal  contraposition :  "Everything  that  is  F  is  G"  entails  "Everything  that  is  not  G  is  
not  F".  
In  addition,  other  forms  of  statements  are  distinguished  and  applied  with  regard  to  
widespread  principles  of  reasoning:  conjunctions  and  biconditionals  as  well  as  existentially  
quantified  propositions  and  the  general  distinction  between  existential  and  universal  
quantifiers  (X.IV.1).  Accordingly,  and  in  addition  to  the  above  group,  we  propose  to  discuss  
the  inference  rules  17–20  as  well  as  related  fallacies  (21).  That  being  said,  one  can  also  
include  other  forms  of  inference  here,  thus  building  a  bridge  to  classical  logic  at  the  
introductory  university  level.  
17. De  Morgan's  laws :  (a)  "not  (p  and  q)"  entails  "(not  p)  or  (not  q)"  and  vice  versa.  (b)  
"not  (p  or  q)"  entails  "(not  p)  and  (not  q)"  and  vice  versa.  
18. Constructive  dilemma :  "p  or  q",  "if  p,  then  r"  and  "if  q,  then  r"  entail  "r"  (analogously  
with  additional  disjuncts).  
19. Universal  constructive  dilemma :  "Everything  that  is  F  is  G  or  H",  "Everything  that  is  G  
is  I"  and  "Everything  that  is  H  is  I"  entail  "Everything  that  is  F  is  I"  (analogously  with  
additional  disjuncts).  
20. Duality :  (a)  "It  is  not  the  case  that  everything  that  is  F  is  G"  entails  "There  is  
something  that  is  F  and  not  G"  and  vice  versa.  (b)  "All  that  is  F  is  G"  entails  "It  is  not  
the  case  that  there  is  something  that  is  F  and  not  G"  and  vice  versa.  
21. Fallacies  with  existentially  quantified  propositions :  for  instance:  (a)  "There  is  
something  that  is  F"  and  "There  is  something  that  is  G"  do  not  entail  "There  is  
something  that  is  F  and  G".  (b)  "For  everything  that  is  F,  there  is  something  that  is  
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connected  to  the  former  by  the  relational  property  G"  does  not  entail  "There  is  
something  that  is  connected  to  everything  that  is  F  by  the  relational  property  G".  
Example  for  (b),  which  occurs  in  a  very  simple  variant  of  the  Cosmological  Argument  
("All  events  have  a  cause.  Therefore:  there  is  a  cause  of  all  events."):  "All  people  
have  parents.  But  it  is  not  the  case  that  there  is  a  parent  of  all  people."  
Charitable  reconstruction :  Are  there  any  other  considerations  that  play  a  role  in  
justifying  the  conclusion?  
7.2  More  complex  Non-deductive  Inferences  and  Further  Errors  
in  Reasoning  
The  non-deductive  inferences  assembled  here  are  not  a  close-knit  group,  just  like  the  
inferences  at  level  III  (see  section  6.4).  They  can  therefore  be  taught  in  any  order  as  well  as  
selectively  and  may  even  be  supplemented  by  other  forms  of  inference.  In  the  following,  we  
also  mention  appropriate  tools  for  a  targeted  criticism  of  arguments  of  the  respective  form.  
22. Generalization  in  more  complex  forms,  for  instance,  as  arguments  by  analogy  of  the   
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form  "The  known  /  examined  things  of  kind  F  exhibit  property  G,"  and  "The  set  of  
known  /  examined  things  of  kind  F  and  the  totality  of  things  of  kind  F  are  structurally  
analogous,"  to  "Everything  that  is  F  is  G".  Alternatively,  as  arguments  by  analogy  in  a  
more  complex  form  (see  below)  or  with  further  statistical  analysis.  
Possible  criticism :  for  instance,  see  argument  by  analogy  below.   
23. Inference  to  the  best  explanation  in  more  complex  forms,  for  instance,  as  the   
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inference  from  "p"  and  "in  the  explanation  of  p,  criteria  K  are  relevant"  and  "q  is, 
given  the  criteria  K,  the  best  explanation  for  p"  to  "q".  
Possible  criticism :  for  instance:  (a)  There  is  another,  better  explanation  for  the  fact  
that  p,  in  light  of  criteria  K.  (Ideally:  Namely  ...)  (b)  For  the  fact  that  p,  the  criteria  K  
are  not  relevant.  (Ideally:  The  relevant  criteria  are  instead  ...)  
24. Argument  by  analogy  in  more  complex  forms,  for  instance,  as  the  inference  from   
28
"(S)  The  domains  A  and  B  are  structurally  identical  with  respect  to  aspect  Z",  "p,"  and  
"If  (S),  then  p  is  true  if  and  only  if  q  is  true"  to  "q".   
29
26  See  the  footnote  on  simpler  variants  in  level  III.  
27  See  the  footnote  on  simpler  variants  in  level  III.  
28  See  the  footnote  on  simpler  variants  in  level  III.  
29  For  example:  (S)  Mice  and  humans  are  very  similar  (structurally  the  same)  in  terms  of  their  relevant   
physiological  characteristics.  p:  The  new  drug  is  effective  in  mice.  If  (S)  then:  If  p,  then  the  new  drug  
also  works  in  humans.  Thus:  The  new  drug  also  works  in  humans.  
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Possible  criticism :  for  instance:  (a)  The  domains  A  and  B  are  not  structurally  identical 
at  all  with  respect  to  aspect  Z.  (Ideally:  This  structural  difference  is  shown  by  ...)  (b)  If  
the  domains  A  and  B  are  structurally  identical  with  respect  to  aspect  Z,  then  it  is  not  
the  case  that  p  is  true  if  and  only  if  q  is  true.  (Ideally:  Rather,  p  would  then  be  true  if  
and  only  if  ...)  
25. Arguments  from  authority  /  expertise,  for  instance,  as  the  inference  from  "S  claims   
30
that  p"  and  "whether  p  is  true  belongs  to  domain  B"  and  "S  is  a  pertinent  expert  /  
authority  for  domain  B"  to  "p".  
Possible  criticism :  for  instance:  (a)  Whether  p  is  true  does  not  belong  to  domain  B.  
(Ideally:  It  rather  belongs  to  the  following  area...)  (b)  S  is  no  expert  /  authority  for  
domain  B  at  all.  (c)  There  are  too  many  other  relevant  experts  /  authorities  for  domain  
B  who  do  not  claim  that  p.  
Next  to  these  argument  patterns,  we  also  suggest  covering  other  fallacies  and  more  complex  
errors  of  argumentation  at  this  level.  These  can  also  be  selected  and  arranged  in  a  number  
of  ways  and  they  can  be  supplemented  with  other  forms  of  inference  –  or  even  be  selectively  
included  earlier  (for  instance,  simple  variants  of  ad  hominem  in  levels  III  or  even  II).  
26. ad  hominem:  A  criticism  of  a  person  making  an  argument  does  not  entail  a  criticism   
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of  the  argument  they  proposed.  
Advanced  consideration:  This  is  also  the  case  with  arguments  from  authority  /  
expertise  (see  above):  In  this  case,  one  can  certainly  criticize  the  expertise  /  authority  
of  S  (variant  (b),  possibly  (c),  above),  but  this  does  not  thereby  impact  upon  the  
person  who  presented  the  argument  (which  relies  on  somebody  else  as  an  expert  /  
authority).  
27. post  hoc,  ergo  propter  hoc:  One  can  by  no  means  conclude  that  event  A  is  the  (or  a   
32
partial)  cause  of  event  B  simply  from  the  fact  that  A  took  place  before  B.  
28. Fallacy  of  Equivocation:  The  use  of  an  ambiguous  expression  in  an  argument  in   
33
which  (a)  the  inference  to  the  conclusion  depends  on  the  expression  in  question  
being  used  with  a  uniform  meaning  for  all  premises,  but  (b)  that  expression  is  used  
with  different  meanings  in  the  different  premises.  
30  See,  e.g.,  Brun  &  Hirsch  Hadorn  (2014),  pp.  290 – 294,  Govier  (1988),  pp.  82 – 84.  
31  See,  e.g.,  Govier  (1988),  pp.  108 – 112,  also  on  the  relationship  between  ad  hominem  and   
arguments  from  authority.  
32  See,  e.g.,  Govier  (1988),  pp.  302–305,  Pfister  (2020),  ch.  16.  
33  See,  e.g.,  Brun  &  Hirsch  Hadorn  (2014),  pp.  306f.  
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Concluding  Remarks  
The  systematic  framework  for  the  development  of  argumentative  skills  proposed  here  is  an  
answer  to  the  tension  described  in  section  1.  On  the  one  hand,  the  teaching  of  
argumentative  skills  is  seen  as  an  important  task  of  education  in  philosophy  and  ethics.  As  
stated  at  the  outset,  these  objectives  are  to  be  found  both  in  the  research  literature  on  the  
teaching  and  learning  of  philosophy  and  in  the  national  and  federal  curricula.  On  the  other  
hand,  neither  curricula  nor  teaching  materials  in  the  German-speaking  world  offer  sufficient  
guidance  for  systematically  furthering  these  skills  in  the  classroom.  This  is  precisely  where  
the  framework  for  fostering  argumentative  skills  presented  here,  with  its  precise,  
progressively  designed  standards,  comes  into  play.  These  standards  for  developing,  
interpreting,  and  evaluating  arguments  can  support  teachers  in  systematically  guiding  
learners  to  develop  argumentative  competences.  The  competences  at  the  introductory  and  
basic  levels  can  already  be  taught  from  the  beginning  of  secondary  school  onwards.  Since  
the  levels  are  designed  systematically  rather  than  with  respect  to  age-groups,  however,  the  
same  standards  can  also  be  used  for  higher  grades  in  schools  or  at  the  introductory  
university  level.  
The  specific  implementation  of  these  standards  in  teaching  and  learning  can  take  many  
forms;  further  inquiry  into  this  matter  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  article.  Concrete  exercises  
to  illustrate  the  standards  as  well  as  accompanying  handouts  for  students  are  currently  in  
development  within  the  DFG-network  "Argumentieren  in  der  Schule"  (Argumentation  in  
Secondary  Schools).  The  draft  presented  here  can  and  should  be  continuously  tested  and  
revised  further,  both  by  means  of  such  additions  as  well  as  by  practical  implementations  and  
trials.  Its  touchstone,  however,  is  the  integration  of  the  practice  of  developing,  interpreting,  
and  evaluating  arguments  into  the  engagement  with  philosophical  questions  and  texts  in  
interplay  with  further  teaching  objectives.  Even  the  trickiest  logical  analyses  in  the  classroom  
are  not  intended  as  a  mere  game,  but  students  must  experience  them  as  illuminating  
contributions  to  answering  genuine  philosophical  questions.   
34
34  We  would  like  to  extend  sincere  thanks  to  Dominik  Balg,  Jürn  Gottschalk,  Eva  Hinternesch,  David   
Lanius,  Hanna  Lucks,  Annika  von  Lüpke,  Laura  Martena,  and  Katharina  Schulz  as  well  as  two  
anonymous  reviewers  for  their  helpful  feedback  on  drafts  of  this  text,  and  to  Ian  Polakiewicz  for  help  
with  the  English  version.  
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